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Based on a sample of 946 German insurance intermediaries, the factors that affect the quality 
of the information services provided by them are studied using OLS-estimations. Applying a 
search theoretical approach, we analyze the impact of supply and demand side variables on 
service quality. Besides, the working of signaling devices (like reputation, advertising or cer-
tificates) to reduce asymmetric information with respect to the service quality of insurance 
intermediaries is examined. The results obtained support the main hypotheses derived from 
industrial organization theories as to the poor working of quality competition under incom-
plete and asymmetric information on the side of consumers. Thus, public policy should con-
centrate on increasing transparency about intermediaries’ (in-)dependence from insurance 
companies and improve consumers’ financial literacy to raise the overall quality of the infor-
maiton services provided by insurance intermediaries. 
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Adequate private insurance becomes more important for consumers even in countries like 
Germany  with  comprehensive  social  protection  systems:  This  is  due  to  the  demographic 
changes ahead, reductions in public insurance coverage and de-regulation of insurance mar-
kets. To obtain the best insurance protection available given ones needs and preferences, con-
sumers must make well-informed purchase decisions. Insurance intermediaries can help them 
to economize on information and transaction costs by providing comprehensive information 
on insurance-related issues. These tend to be high for such complex goods due to incomplete 
and asymmetric information on consumers’ side.
1  
However, the market for insurance mediation is itself characterized by incomplete and asym-
metric information about the quality of the services provided by insurance agents and brokers. 
Again and again, there are concerns about malpractices of insurance intermediaries which 
may induce consumers to buy inadequate insurance coverage. This raises the question as to 
the proper regulation of insurance intermediaries from a consumers’ protection point of view.
2 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to provide more profound insights into the factors that 
influence conduct and performance in markets for insurance intermediation. In particular, we 
are interested in the factors that affect the quality of the information services provided by in-
surance intermediaries.  
In the following, section 2 gives a short overview of the related empirical literature. The hy-
potheses to be tested are stated in section 3, while section 4 describes the data used and the 
methodology applied. The econometric results are presented and discussed in section 5. Sec-
tion 6 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of the Empirical Literature 
There is only a small strand of empirical literature which explicitly studies market conduct 
and  performance  of  insurance  intermediaries.
3  There  are  some  rather  descriptive  studies 
which analyze ethical problems of insurance intermediaries in the US. Based on a survey in 
                                                 
1   There is a vast literature that deals with the problems resulting from aymmetric information on the side of 
insurance companies, see for example Dionne/ Doherty/ Fombaron (2000). 
2   After years of discussion, in 2002 the EU finally passed a directive on insurance mediation which should 
have been implemented by the member states by 2005. However, so far not all countries have done that. 
3   See Regan/ Tennyson (2000) and Eckardt (2005, 147-154) for a more detailed account.   3
which intermediaries and other insurance professionals are asked what ethical dilemmas they 
face or what they hold relevant for their profession, Cooper/Frank (2002) find that the main 
issues deemed relevant are false or misleading information about insurance products, failure 
to correctly identify and recommend matching insurance products for consumers needs, and 
lack of knowledge or skills on the side of the intermediaries. High competitive pressure both 
to the intermediaries and to insurance companies is seen as a major factor, which prevents 
ethical behavior. This is in line with similar surveys by Howe/Hoffman/ Hardigree (1994) and 
Eastman/ Eastman/ Eastman (1996).  
Although these studies may be burdened with non-response and social desirability bias, their 
results are in accordance with the findings of ‘mystery shopping’ interviews carried out in 
Germany on the information and counseling quality of different types of insurance intermedi-
aries (Cap Gemini Ernst & Young 2002; Evers/ Habschick 2000; Ökotest 2004). They mostly 
concern personal insurance lines, in particular provision for old-age income. They show that 
most intermediaries fall short of attaining the benchmarks which are set in advance of the sce-
nario-based interviews. However, insurance brokers usually show better performance than 
exclusive agents. 
Doerpinghaus (1991) and Barrese/ Doerpinghaus/ Nelson (1995) use complaint data to regu-
latory bodies as an indicator for the service quality provided by insurers with different distri-
bution systems. They test the hypothesis that better consumer service should lead to lower 
complaint ratios for direct writers and independent insurers. While Doerpinghaus (1991) finds 
no statistically significant impact of different distribution systems, Barrese/ Doerpinghaus/ 
Nelson (1995) find some evidence for this hypothesis for independent insurers.  
There are also a few econometric studies that analyze more comprehensively the services pro-
vided by insurance intermediaries. The findings of Etgar (1976) do not support the hypothesis 
that independent agents provide overall better service quality than exclusive agents. However, 
they are significantly more active in claims settlement than exclusive agents, but there is 
mixed evidence on their service quality regarding assistance in risk analysis and in placing 
insurance applications. Cummins/ Weisbart (1977) obtain similar results in a study on nearly 
700 insurance intermediaries, which operate in three different US states in personal insurance 
lines. Again, independent agents are found to provide better claims settlement services and to 
review coverage more often, while they provide less service quality than exclusive agents in 
other dimensions. Eckardt (2002) provides a study based on a sample of 860 German exclu-
sive agents and insurance brokers, who are mainly engaged in personal lines. Mean differ-  4
ences parametric tests reveal a number of highly significant differences in both quantitative 
and qualitative variables. For example, insurance brokers devote a significantly larger share of 
their  total  time  budget  to  information  acquisition  and  processing,  while  exclusive  agents 
spend more time with counseling interviews. However, in absolute terms counseling inter-
views of insurance brokers take significantly longer. Besides, in counseling interviews insur-
ance brokers put significantly more weight on information about products for risk provision 
and on contract design as well as on product design. Overall, they realize a significantly 
higher contract conclusion rate and experience significantly less competitive pressure than 
exclusive agents. There are no significant differences in the share of the time budget spent on 
claims settlement. Exclusive agents even put significantly more weight on informing their 
customers about claims settlement issues than insurance brokers. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Etgar (1976) and Cummins/ Weisbart (1977). However, these studies use a more 
detailed qualitative specification to measure engagement in claims settlement services than 
the time share spent on it. Therefore, it may well be the case that independent agents and bro-
kers are simply more productive in claims settlement services than exclusive agents. 
Studies that analyze the impact of compensation schemes on the information provision of in-
termediaries do not support the hypothesis that outcome-oriented compensation schemes have 
a negative impact on information provision about unfavorable product characteristics (Kur-
land 1995, 1996; Cupach/ Carson 2002; Zweifel/ Ghermi 1990; Laslett/ Wilsdon/ Malcolm 
2002; Cummins/ Doherty 2005). 
The vast majority of empirical studies concentrates on differences in the relative efficiency of 
insurance companies that use different distribution systems (Berger/ Cummins/ Weiss 1997). 
The unit of analysis are not the insurance intermediaries, but insurance companies. The im-
pact of exclusive versus independent intermediaries on insurance companies’ performance is 
analyzed by including a dummy variable which accounts for the main distribution system 
used. Therefore, these studies do not allow any statements about quality differences between 
single intermediaries. Moreover, they are not concerned with market behavior and perform-
ance of intermediary firms. However, they provide a lot of arguments that attempt to explain 
the persistence of different distribution systems due to differences in the services provided by 
either direct writers or independent insurers. For example, independent agents seem to be bet-
ter suited for tailoring insurance coverage to consumers’ needs than exclusive agent and for 
mitigating agency problems between shareholders and policyholders which result from organ-  5
izational form.
4 There is also evidence for the US market that independent agents are less 
beneficial for larger insurance firms and larger market size and for those in which long-term 
relations are valued and relation-specific investment is more important (for example Berger/ 
Cummins/ Weiss 1997; Hosely 1996; John/ Weitz 1989; Regan/Tennyson 1996, 2000; Regan 
1997; Regan/Tzeng 1999).  
To summarize, empirical studies which analyze the co-existence of different distribution sys-
tems provide a lot of arguments that attempt to explain their persistence. However, they focus 
primarily on the US insurance market, in particular for property-liability insurance. To what 
degree these findings can be generalized remains an open question until more empirical re-
search for different countries and different lines of insurance is available. Nevertheless, em-
pirical evidence suggests that different distribution systems provide different services with 
respect to shareholders, insurance companies and policyholders. This is in line with the few 
econometric studies, which explicitly use insurance intermediaries as the unit of analysis. 
Many of the studies, which analyze intermediaries’ service provision, are descriptive in nature 
and/ or focus on a rather narrow set of behavior. We are not aware of any comprehensive in-
dustrial organization studies. In particular, detailed empirical analyses of the determinants 
which  influence  the  information  services  provided  by  insurance  intermediaries  on  market 
conduct and performance are missing. 
 
3. Hypotheses to be tested 
In insurance markets, intermediaries act as match-makers (Eckardt 2005, 1-20). They coordi-
nate supply and demand by providing information and advisory services, bargaining services 
and administrative services. Since information is essential for all services that intermediaries 
offer in the different stages of an insurance transaction, we concentrate on the quality of their 
information services in the following empirical analysis (figure 1).  
Information services are intangible, so that their quality cannot be measured in an objective 
way. Therefore, we use two indicators to measure the performance of insurance intermediar-
ies.
5 The first one is an input-oriented information index which refers to the content of the 
information services provided. The second one is the average contract conclusion rate as a 
                                                 
4   Note, however, that the findings show just the contrary when comparing the dominant distribution systems 
for stock companies and mutuals in the US respectively in the UK (Baranoff/ Sager 2003; Kim/ Mayers/ 
Smith 1996; Mayer/ Smith 1981 for the US and Ward 2003 for the UK). 
5   For details see section 4 below.   6
more subjective output-oriented indicator being also a proxy for insurance intermediaries’ 
economic success. Market outcomes result from the efforts spent on the supply side to pro-
duce high quality information services, but also from demand side variables. Besides, it is also 
influenced by competitive activities of the intermediaries who have to take into account the 
particularities of markets for information services (mainly incomplete and asymmetric infor-
mation on consumers’ side). Therefore, we derive a number of hypotheses which concern the 
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Figure 1: Relevant Information in the Transaction Stages  
Supply Side Hypotheses 
Hypotheses about the production of information services by insurance intermediaries are de-
rived from a search theoretic model.
6 According to it, consumers can either personally search 
for information about insurance relevant topics or turn to insurance intermediaries who sell 
such information. It can be shown that a consumer’s ‘make-or-buy’- decision on information 
search is a function of her willingness to pay, the minimum quality level guaranteed by an 
insurance intermediary and the fee charged for it. For an intermediary to find the profit-
maximizing quality and fee of his services, he has to take into account consumers’ make-or-
buy decision which affects the size of the market and the costs associated with producing a 
certain level of information service quality. These costs mainly depend on the search technol-
ogy applied.  
Insurance intermediaries spend time and resources to gather, process and assess information 
relevant for consumers. Search for information about insurance products requires first and 
                                                 
6   For a detailed formal analysis see Eckardt (2005, 45-92); Rose (1999).   7
foremost time and human capital. That is, an intermediary must know what information to 
search for, where to find it and how to process it, so that it becomes relevant for a specific 
customer. Generally, hypothesis 1 states that the information quality provided by an interme-
diary is the higher, the more effort is spent to produce it. More precisely, it is contended that 
the higher investment in human capital is and the more time is spent on searching and proc-
essing information and on counseling customers, the higher is the information quality pro-
vided.  
Hypothesis 2 takes into account that the underlying information distribution from which an 
intermediary gains his information also influences the quality of the information services. The 
more the sources to which an intermediary has access contain relevant information, the lower 
are the costs of producing a certain quality level. Accordingly, hypothesis 2 states that the 
better the information sources are, the higher is the information quality provided.  
The quality of the information services also depends on the content of the information pro-
vided in counseling interviews. Thus, according to hypothesis 3 the more information about 
relevant subjects is provided, the higher the information quality is. 
Division of labor and specialization can also positively influence the information quality since 
they reduce search costs for producing a particular quality level of information services. De-
pending on firm size and structure it is assumed that the higher the number of employees are 
and the higher the number of agents or brokers employed by an insurance intermediary are, 
the more each intermediary can specialize on his original tasks and, thus, realize gains from 
specialization and division of labor. Besides, there might be positive spill-overs due to infor-
mation sharing among the intermediaries of the same firm. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 states 
that larger insurance intermediary firms or a larger number of intermediaries provide better 
information quality.  
Besides, insurance companies try to induce intermediaries by vertical restraints as well as 
through their compensation schemes to distribute mainly their products, no matter whether 
these are the best matching ones for a particular customer (Eckardt 2005, 127-136; Katz 1989; 
Perry 1989; Zeithaml/ Bitner 2003). Thus, hypothesis 5 states that the more independent an 
insurance intermediary is from a particular insurance company, the higher is the information 
quality he provides. Economic and legal independence of insurance intermediaries depend 
primarily  on the distribution channels in which  they  are  engaged.  Accordingly,  exclusive 
agents should be expected to provide lower information quality than independent agents or 
insurance brokers.   8
Demand Side Hypotheses 
The search theoretic approach to insurance intermediation contends that consumers’ willing-
ness to pay affects market outcomes positively (Eckardt 2005, 106-108). Since a higher will-
ingness to pay results in a higher demand for high quality information, this should lead to bet-
ter information services provided by insurance intermediaries (hypothesis 6). 
Insurance intermediary markets are characterized by consumers having incomplete informa-
tion on insurance intermediaries’ service quality. With only uninformed consumers about in-
surance relevant matters it does not pay for intermediaries to provide costly high quality in-
formation. However, this is not the case if at least part of the consumers are informed, that is, 
have a high level of knowledge. Thus, by applying a modified version of Salop/ Stiglitz 
(1977) it can be argued that the higher consumers’ level of knowledge about insurance rele-
vant topics is, the higher is the information service quality provided by intermediaries (hy-
pothesis 7).  
Competition under Asymmetric Information 
Markets of insurance intermediaries are characterized by profound information asymmetries 
with intermediaries being better informed than their clients about the true quality of the ser-
vices they provide. The principal-agent literature discusses a number of signaling instruments 
(like  reputation,  advertising,  certificates,  membership  in  a  professional  association)  which 
may enable agents to credibly signal their quality to consumers and, thus, limit the scope of 
adverse selection (Riley 2001; Kirmani/ Rao 2000; Eckardt 2005, 117-126). To test whether 
these signaling instruments work in the market of insurance intermediaries, we hypothesize 
that an insurance intermediary using signaling instruments provides high quality information 
services (hypothesis 8).  
Additionally, the intensity and kind of competition in the market of insurance intermediaries 
influences its outcomes in terms of the information quality provided. Markets for insurance 
intermediaries are monopolistically competitive with usually low costs of market entry. How-
ever, it can be shown that due to consumers’ positive search costs an increase in competition 
does not lead to the provision of higher information quality by insurance intermediaries (hy-
pothesis 9) (Eckardt 2005, 103-105 following Salop/Stiglitz 1977).  
However, by product differentiation or by other competitive strategies, an insurance interme-
diary may realize a monopolistic position where competition is less intense. Therefore, we test 
hypothesis 10 that a particular competitive strategy (like improving information quality or   9
specializing on particular customer segments) leads to the provision of better market perform-
ance.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the hypotheses to be tested, the independent variables 
and the expected relationships. Hypotheses H 1 to H 5 refer to supply side aspects, hypotheses 
H 6 and H 7 to demand side specificities, while hypotheses H 8 to H 10 concern competitive 
behavior under asymmetric information.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
Data is obtained from a survey among 4,687 self-employed German insurance intermediaries, 
which was carried out in autumn 2001. As there is no legal duty to register for insurance in-
termediaries in Germany the total population is unknown. Thus, the addresses of the inter-
viewees were randomly chosen from online directories and from the yellow pages. 945 insur-
ance intermediaries answered the questionnaire, implying a response rate of 20%. Among the 
respondents 423 are self-employed exclusive insurance agents, 67 are independent insurance 
agents and 437 are insurance brokers.
7 Data was collected about individual and firm charac-
teristics of the interviewed insurance intermediary, the services offered, the intermediation 
process and general market conditions.
8  
Dependent Variables 
We estimate two different performance measures in markets for insurance intermediation. To 
explain the information quality provided, we use an information index as the dependent vari-
able. To analyze economic success more generally, we use the contract conclusion rate as a 
proxy since we have no data on profits or revenues. 
The variable information index is an input-oriented summary indicator. It captures the weight 
that an insurance intermediary attaches to 27 subjects about a customer’s need for insurance 
protection, insurance products and coverage, policy design and contract terms.
9 Half the items 
deal with the particularities of private old-age insurance. This is justified by the fact that this 
                                                 
7   The sample represents the regional demographic distribution of the German population well (Federal Statis-
tical Office 2004, 26). It also captures the main distribution channels, which account for two thirds of the to-
tal premium income gained in the German insurance market (GDV 2002). 
8   As the pretest showed a very low willingness to answer questions to remuneration patterns, costs, turnovers, 
and profits, they were omitted from the survey.  
9   For more details on the single items, see the variables underlying the factor analysis in Tables A.3 in the 
Appendix.   10
insurance line makes for the largest share of insurance intermediaries’ income. For each item 
the interviewee is asked how much importance he gives to it in his counseling interviews. 
Answers are measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = totally unimportant to 5 = very 
important. Then, for each intermediary the mean value is calculated after summing up all 27 
items. Although this input-oriented variable is concerned with the content of the information 
provided, it makes neither statements about the actual information provided nor whether the 
information provided is accurate from an objective point of view since participants may over-
state their service quality. However, response bias can be reasonably assumed to occur simi-
larly for all interviewees.
10  
A second measure is the contract conclusion rate variable that we use as a proxy for market 
performance and economic success. It indicates the percentage of counseling interviews an 
intermediary conducts that on average result in consumers actually concluding an insurance 
contract. Note that this success rate is not a profitability measure since the contract conclusion 
rate provides no information on the premiums of the contracts concluded nor the revenues 
gained by them. However, this output-oriented variable can be also interpreted as a more sub-
jective indicator of the information quality provided. It indicates that customers are satisfied 
with the information and advice given by an intermediary during a counseling interview. Ac-
cordingly, the higher an intermediary’s contract conclusion rate is, the better is his informa-
tion quality as subjectively perceived by consumers. In this sense, a higher share of satisfied 
customers indicates better market performance.  
Independent Variables 
The behavior of insurance intermediaries may differ according to their (in-)dependence from 
insurance companies and because of different regualtory rules. The variable intermediary type 
distinguishes between the distribution channels to which an interviewee belongs (exclusive 
agents, independent agents, insurance brokers). The German market for insurance intermedi-
aries is widely unregulated (Mauntel 2004; Rehberg 2003, 178-215).
11 There are no formal 
entry restrictions other than having a trading license. To get such a license from the Trade 
Supervisory Office (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) requires only having a certificate issued by the 
police stating that the holder has no criminal record. No registration, financial skills or finan-
                                                 
10   Thus, focus should be on the sign of the coefficients reported in the regressions, which indicate whether the 
independent variables lead to an increase or to a decrease of the service quality provided, not on their abso-
lute values. See also Etgar (1976). 
11  With the implementation of the EU Directive on Insurance Mediation there will be stricter regulations also 
for German insurance intermediaries, see Schönleiter (2005).    11
cial guarantees are mandatory. Conduct regulation is also very weak. Exclusive and inde-
pendent agents differ from insurance brokers regarding the legal responsibilities in case of the 
kind and amount of information provided to consumers. For exclusive and independent agents 
the respective insurance companies are held responsible in case an agent provides false or 
misleading information about policy benefits, terms and conditions, dividends or premiums. 
To insurance brokers more strict liability rules in case of professional negligence apply. Nev-
ertheless, professional indemnity insurance is not compulsory. Disclosure regulations are of a 
rather general nature as well. It is neither prescribed in detail what information has to be 
passed to consumers, nor in what form this has to be done. Finally, there is a general ban on 
rebating commissions both for insurance agents and brokers. That is, for insurance intermedi-
aries, resale price maintenance is legally sanctioned.  
The questionnaire inquired about human capital variables and the inputs used for producing 
information services. Besides age and investment in human capital (formal education, (addi-
tional) training, university degree, work experience, further training), the participants were 
asked which percentage of their total time budget they spend on different activities (informa-
tion  acquisition  and  processing,  counseling  interviews,  further  training,  claims  settlement, 
sales efforts). The larger the proportion of time devoted to information acquisition and proc-
essing or to counseling interviews is, the more information about insurance products and their 
characteristics as well as about the specific needs of the clients can be gathered and the higher 
the information quality would be. Besides, the average duration of counseling interviews in 
absolute terms is used to account for the quantitative input to information production (dura-
tion_interviews).  
The  quality  of  the  information  provided  depends  also  on  the  quality  of  the  information 
sources used. To gain information about this aspect, we calculated the variable information 
source as the product of the importance of a certain information provider (like an insurance 
company or a rating agency) to an intermediary and the objectivity the latter attaches to it. For 
further trainings there is no variable that shows the credibility attached to it as a reliable in-
formation source. Therefore, source_further training indicates only the importance of this 
information source without making statements about its perceived objectivity by an interme-
diary. We expect that intermediaries, who rely strongly on more credible information sources, 
provide better information quality to their customers. 
To account for the information content provided, the interviewees were asked which weight 
they give to 27 different aspects in counseling interviews that are relevant from an objective   12
point of view for consumers to decide rationally about insurance coverage (see above infor-
mation index).
12 It is assumed that an intermediary informs his customers more extensively 
about those aspects to which he attaches more weight. Together with general information, 
product information and information on contract design, the interviewees were questioned 
about particular topics relevant for old-age insurance. Furthermore, as the participation in 
surplus is an important sales argument for life assurances, different items were asked about 
this subject to see how much weight intermediaries put on informing consumers about the 
components of the calculations normally used. The 27 items were measured on a five-point 
Likert scale. By performing a factor analysis, seven factors were extracted which are used as 
independent variables to account for the information content provided (Tables A.3 and  A.4 in 
the Appendix).
13 They comprehend general aspects, insurance products, contract design, in-
formation on old-age insurance, calculation of participation rates.  
To capture the impact of specialization effects in producing information services, we included 
variables  which  account  for  firm  size  and  structure  (employees_number,  intermediar-
ies_number).  
Differences in consumers’ own knowledge about insurance matters can also lead to differ-
ences in the information quality provided. Generally, the more knowledge consumers have 
about the relevant subjects, the higher the information quality of an intermediary is likely to 
be. Otherwise, customers would be dissatisfied and turn to another intermediary. The same 
holds true for differences in the demand for information and other services. Again, we expect 
a positive relationship between the level of demand and the information quality. Customers’ 
demand and customers’ knowledge are both measured on five-point Likert scales with lower 
values indicating lower levels of knowledge respectively demand.  
In order to capture the impact of insurance intermediaries’ behavior under asymmetric infor-
mation, we include a number of signaling variables. The pretest showed that insurance inter-
mediaries nearly unanimously held reputation to be of relevance for signaling high quality 
services. Therefore, we dropped this item from our survey. Instead we asked what impact dif-
ferent factors have for acquiring a positive reputation. For eleven activities the participants in 
the survey indicated how important they perceive them for building a good reputation. Each 
                                                 
12   Since the dependent variable information index is based on the same 27 items, the following variables are 
only used as regressors on the contract conclusion rate, see equations 4 to 6 in table 2 below. 
13  Although factor analysis assumes interval data, Jaccard and Wan (1996, 4) summarize in a recent review of 
the literature on this topic that with ordinal Likert scale items “for many statistical tests, rather severe depar-
tures (from intervalness) do not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors dramatically.”    13
item is measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1= unimportant to 5= very important. Ac-
cording to the factor analysis we performed, the most important factor comprehends activities, 
which concern the provision of high information quality (Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix). 
By contrast, items that load high on the service provided by an intermediary or on his sales 
efforts are of less importance.  
To see whether signaling instruments are credible in that they indicate higher information 
quality, the participants were asked what other signaling instruments they use, like advertis-
ing campaigns, customer specialization or membership in a professional association.  
Finally, to test the impact of competition we asked about the competitive pressure perceived 
by an intermediary. Since no data concerning the number of competitors, market shares or 
profits for the intermediation market are available, we use this as a proxy. The higher the sub-
jectively perceived competitive pressure is, the more an intermediary will act as if facing in-
tense competition. Thus, whether this perception is true or not plays no role with respect to 
the consequences in terms of market conduct in an objective sense. Moreover, in order to ana-
lyze the impact of different reactions to strong competitive pressure on market performance, 
we asked what competitive strategies an intermediary follows.  
Table 1 summarizes the definition and measurement of the variables. The main descriptive 
statistics of the variables included in the following estimations are reported in Table A.2 in the 
Appendix.  
The hypotheses are tested by using OLS-estimations.
14 For the dependent variable informa-
tion index we perform linear OLS-estimations. For the contract conclusion rate as dependent 
variable we apply a logistic function (Cooper/ Nakanishi 1988). This accounts for the fact that 
when starting from a low level increases in inputs first result in disproportionately high and 
then in disproportionately low increases in the contract conclusion rate. To see whether the 
explanatory  variables  are  interdependent,  we proceed sequentially and observe coefficient 
reactions to additionally included groups of variables. All in all, we perform three specifica-
tions for each dependent variable. Equations 1 and 4 concern supply side variables, equations 
2 and 5 also account for demand side variables, while equations 3 and 6 additionally capture 
signaling and competition variables. The results are discussed in the following section. 
                                                 
14   For the assumptions of the linear OLS regression, see Greene (2000, 210-264). The estimations are cor-
rected for heteroscedasticity where necessary.   14
Table 1:  Definition and Measurement of Variables 





  Information index  Continuous variable measuring the mean value of 27 items
15 about the 
importance attached to different aspects in counseling interviews by the 
intermediary ranging from  
1 = very  low quality ... 5 = very high quality 
  Contract conclusion 
rate 
Continuous variable measuring the proportion of the average number of 
counseling interviews on all interviews that lead to contract conclusion 
 






Intermediary type  Set of dummy variables with 1 = intermediary type, 0 = other:  
exclusive agent; independent agent; insurance broker  
reference class: insurance broker 
Human Capi-
tal Variables 
Age  Continuous variable measuring the age of the interviewed intermediary 
in years 
  Formal education  Set of dummy variables with 1 = highest degree of formal education, 0 
= other: 
lower secondary school; intermediate leaving certificate; certificate of 
aptitude for  specialized short-course higher education; general certifi-
cate of aptitude for higher education  
reference class: general certificate of aptitude for higher education  
  (Additional) Training  Dummy variable with 1 = (additional) training, 0 = none 
  University degree  Dummy variable with 1 = university degree, 0 = none 
  Work experience  Continuous variable measuring work experience in years 
  Further train-
ing_number 
Continuous variable measuring the number of further training courses, 




Time budget  5 continuous variables measuring the share of the time spent for a cer-
tain activity on the total time budget:  
information acquisition and processing; counseling interviews; further 
training; claims settlement; sales efforts 
  Duration_interviews  Continuous variable measuring the average duration of general counsel-
ing interviews in minutes 
  Information source  7 continuous variables measuring the importance of an information 
source used by an intermediary with its attached objectivity on a  
25-point rating scale with 1 = very subjective  and not at all important 
source … 25 = very credible and very important source: 
insurance companies; professional associations; rating agencies; con-
sumers’ associations; science; specialist publications; general media  
 
                                                 
15   For the single items see Table A.3 in the Appendix.   15
Table 1:  Definition and Measurement of Variables (cont.) 
  Variable  Explanation and Measurement 
  Source_further train-
ing 
Ordinal variable measuring the importance attached to further training 
as an information source measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = 
not at all important … 5 = very important  
  Information content  7 continuous variables measuring the factor scores extracted by a factor 
analysis from 27 items which indicate the importance attached to differ-
ent aspects in counseling interviews by the intermediary:
16 
old-age security in general; calculation of participation rates; contract 
design; personal risk profile and needs; policy design; private old-age 
insurance products; claims settlement 
Specialization 
Variables 




Continuous variable measuring the number of agents and brokers em-
ployed by an intermediary’s firm 
 
Demand Side Variables 
 
 
  Customers’ demand  2 ordinal variables measuring consumers’ demand on a five-point Likert 
scale with 1 = more modest … 5 = more demanding about: 
information provision; additional services for free 
  Customers’ know-
ledge 
3 ordinal variables indicating customers’ knowledge on a five-point 
Likert scale with 1 = very bad knowledge … 5 =  very good knowledge: 
risk profile; old-age protection provisions; (dis-)advantages of insurance 
products 
 




Reputation  3 continuous variables measuring the factor scores extracted by a factor 
analysis from 11 items indicating the importance attached to different 
aspects to gain high reputation:
17 
information; good service; sales efforts 
  Other signaling in-
struments 
10 dichotomous variables with 1 = signaling instrument is used,  
0 = not used: 
none; advertising campaigns; customer specialization; good service; 
public lectures, seminars; qualification, specialized knowledge; objec-
tive information and counseling; specialization on certain insurance 
companies; membership in a professional association; miscellaneous 
Competition 
Variables 
Competitive pressure  Ordinary variable measuring the extent of competitive pressure on a 
five-point Likert scale with 1 = none … 5 = very strong  
  Competitive strategies  
 
8 dichotomous variables with 1 = competitive strategy pursued by an 
intermediary, 0 = not pursued: 
more advertising campaigns; better counseling quality; cost reduction; 
consultation time savings; customer specialization; additional services 
for a fee; additional services for free; miscellaneous 
                                                 
16   For more details see Tables A.3 and  A.4 in the Appendix. 
17  For more details
 see Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix.   16
5. Regression Results and Discussion 
The empirical results of the linear OLS regression equations are reported in Table 2 below. 
Hypothesis 1 – Efforts Spent 
According to equations 1 and 4 investment in human capital shows no impact on market per-
formance, neither with regard to the quality of the information services provided nor to the 
share of contracts concluded by an intermediary. Only age has a significant negative impact 
on the contract conclusion rate. All in all, this is in contrast to hypothesis 1. Since the vari-
ables  on  formal  education,  (additional)  training,  university  degree  and  work  experience 
showed no statistically significant impact across the various specifications, we dropped them 
from the other regressions reported. They do not qualitatively change any major results. 
When using the information index as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimates for the 
percentage of time spent on further training, claims settlement and counseling interviews are 
positive for all specifications, with the estimates for further training and claims settlements 
being significant across all equations. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1 that more 
efforts spent on activities which are related to the production of information services increase 
the quality provided. However, the coefficient estimate for the time spent on information ac-
quisition and procession has a negative impact on the information quality provided. Obvi-
ously, insurance intermediaries gain specific knowledge about what topics and what informa-
tion is relevant for consumers mainly through investment in further trainings and by claims 
settlement. These two activities exhibit large fixed costs. Besides, information about claims 
settlement is highly specific. It entails consumer-specific information about the likelihood of 
damage and insurance company-specific information about the consequences of specific con-
tract terms for claims settlement as well as insurance companies’ handling in case of loss. 
Thus,  these  results  also  support  the  hypothesis  that  intermediated  search  has  advantages, 
which cannot be attained through personal search by consumers. For a single consumer nei-
ther the high costs of attending insurance intermediaries’ further trainings would pay off nor 
does she have the chance to acquire the activity-specific knowledge resulting from claims 
settlement.  
The coefficient estimates of nearly all time budget variables show a negative impact on the 
contract conclusion rate, with the coefficient estimate for the percentage of time spent on 
sales efforts being statistically significant across all equations. Compared to the findings for 
the information index variable, time spent on further trainings and on claims settlement has a 
negative impact on the contract conclusion rate. However, the coefficient estimate for the per-  17
centage of time spent on counseling interviews shows a positive impact for all equations. This 
is confirmed by the estimate for the duration_interviews variable, which is statistically sig-
nificant across all equations. Accordingly, time spent for counseling seems to enhance both 
the information quality provided as well as the percentage of contracts concluded.  
All in all, our data provides no evidence that investment in human capital and most other ac-
tivities necessary to provide intermediary services have a positive impact on an intermediary’s 
market performance, be it in terms of the information quality provided or of the contracts 
concluded. Therefore, our evidence does not confirm hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 – Information Sources 
The estimation results for equations 1 to 3 indicate that intermediaries, who rely strongly on 
insurance companies, rating agencies, consumers’ associations, the science and specialist 
publications as sources of credible information, provide significantly higher information qual-
ity across all equations.
18 In comparison, estimation results suggest that intermediaries who 
perceive the general media as a very important and credible information source produce lower 
information quality. Information in the general media are published for a broad audience. It is 
necessary for them to simplify matters, so that the information thus disseminated is of a rather 
unspecific nature. Therefore, the general media usually is merely an insufficient source for 
acquiring the highly specialized information needed to give profound advice on insurance 
coverage. All in all, our evidence supports hypothesis 2 that the information quality provided 
depends on the underlying information sources.  
However, this does not hold with respect to the contract conclusion rate. Equation 4 shows 
that the underlying information source has no significant impact so that we omit these vari-
ables in equations 5 and 6. 
Hypothesis 3 – Information Content 
To test hypothesis 3 we include variables on the information content of counseling interviews 
in equations 4 to 6. Our data reveals a mostly statistically significant positive impact on the 
contract conclusion rate if an intermediary puts weight on informing his customers on their 
personal risk profile and security options, on the calculation of participation rates and on the 
particularities of private old-age insurance products. In contrast to that, providing information 
about contract design and policy design results in a lower contract conclusion rate. However, 
                                                 
18   Only when including signaling and competition variables the impact of rating agencies as a credible infor-
mation source becomes insignificant.   18
the coefficient estimates are insignificant. There seems to be a conflict for intermediaries be-
tween economic success as measured by the contract conclusion rate and providing detailed 
information about relevant contractual aspects of insurance coverage. Thus, our evidence sug-
gests only mixed support for hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 – Division of Labor and Specialization 
The coefficient estimates for firm size measured by the employees_number variable and for 
firm structure measured by the intermediaries_number variable employed in a firm, show no 
significant impact on the information quality provided. Since this holds true for all other 
specifications, we drop these variables from the reported regressions (equations 2, 3 and 5). 
This does not qualitatively change any of our major results. Only when including signaling 
activities and controlling for competitive pressure and related behavior in equation 6 firm size 
shows a significant positive impact on the contract conclusion rate. Obviously, successful 
signaling and competitive strategies exhibit some form of fixed costs which do not influence  
the quality of the information services. 
All in all, out findings do not confirm hypothesis 4 that division of labor has a positive impact 
on the information quality provided. Acquiring and processing information about topics rele-
vant for concluding an insurance contract seem to exhibit divisibilities among members of the 
same agency.
19   
Hypothesis 5 – Independence from Insurance Companies 
Compared to being an insurance broker, being an exclusive or independent agent and, thus, 
more dependent from insurance companies has a negative impact both on the information 
quality provided and on the contract conclusion rate. The coefficient estimates for the inter-
mediary type variables are significantly negative. When controlling for signaling activities 
and competitive behavior (equations 3 and 6), the coefficient estimate for the information 
quality provided by exclusive agents becomes even higher, while the impact of being an ex-
clusive agent on the contract conclusion rate is lessened. This may be due to the fact that ex-
clusive agents realize on average more competitive pressure than insurance brokers and usu-
ally also provide lower information quality (Eckardt 2002). 
                                                 
19   This is in line with findings of Cummins (1977) that there are no scale economies for independent insurance 
agents.   19
Hypothesis 6 – Customers’ Demand 
We find a positive relationship between customers’ demand for information and the informa-
tion quality actually provided by an intermediary. Interestingly, the same holds true with re-
spect to customers’ demand for additional services. Its coefficient estimate is significant as 
long as we do not include variables in the regression  that account for signaling behavior and 
competition (equations 3). In contrast to that, the coefficient estimates are negative with re-
spect to the contract conclusion rate (equation 5). But since they are not significant, we omit-
ted them from equation 6. All in all, our data provides only weak support for hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 7 – Customers’ Knowledge 
The evidence on the impact of customers’ knowledge on the information index is somehow 
mixed. The coefficient estimates for customers’ knowledge about their risk profile and about 
the (dis-)advantages of insurance products compared to other financial assets are positive. In 
contrast, the coefficient estimate for customers’ knowledge about old-age protection provi-
sions is negative and statistically significant as long as we do not control for signaling and 
competitive behavior. This suggests that intermediaries provide only additional information 
and thus higher information quality, if their customers have a low level of knowledge about 
protection for old-age security. In case of customers with low financial literacy concerning 
their risks and the particularities of insurance products, intermediaries provide only low in-
formation quality. 
There are two possible answers to this finding. On the one hand, this seems to be a quite 
straightforward result since half of the items summarized in the dependent variable informa-
tion index concern old-age protection. It would be rather superfluous for an intermediary to 
put much weight on such topics if his customers already have a high level of knowledge about 
them. On the other hand, insurance intermediaries rely strongly on income from selling life 
insurance policies and other products concerning old-age security. Accordingly, they should 
have an interest in increasing consumers’ knowledge about exactly such insurance products. 
This is in line with the finding that insurance intermediaries do not provide high quality in-
formation to customers with low knowledge on the disadvantages of insurance products com-
pared to other financial assets which can be used as substitutes.  
The regression results for the contract conclusion rate confirm these findings (equations 5 and 
6). They indicate that intermediaries significantly profit from customers with a high level of 
knowledge about old-age protection provisions in terms of the contracts concluded. However,   20
a high level of knowledge about the disadvantages of insurance products leads to a lower con-
tract conclusion rate. 
Thus, taken together, our data is consistent with hypothesis 7. Insurance intermediaries put 
only more emphasis on providing high quality information to customers with low knowledge 
if it is necessary to induce them to conclude an insurance contract.  
Hypothesis 8 – Signaling Activities 
The inclusion of the demand side variables in equations 2 and  5 increased the overall quality 
of our regression only to a very low degree. In comparison, adding variables that account for 
the impact of signaling activities and competition raises the adjusted R
2 of the specification 
estimated in equation 3 by 21 percentage points and by nearly 12 percentage points in equa-
tion 6. Thus, signaling activities and competition behavior seem to be more relevant for dif-
ferences in the information quality provided than demand side variables. 
Our data supports hypothesis 8 that intermediaries, who believe that providing high quality 
information services and good service is relevant for gaining a positive reputation, do provide 
significantly better information quality. This also holds for the contract conclusion rate. Thus, 
reputation proves to be a credible signaling instrument for high quality performance.  
The other signaling instruments included in the regressions show mixed results. While quali-
fication has a significant positive impact on the information index, giving public lectures on 
insurance coverage or related subjects leads to a significant increase in the contract conclu-
sion rate. In contrast to that, the coefficient estimate for membership in a professional asso-
ciation dummy is significantly negative both in equations 3 and 6. This may indicate that 
these intermediaries use their membership in a professional association as a substitute for the 
actual provision of high quality information. The resulting reduction of their overall efforts 
then, in turn, has a negative impact on their overall market performance. All other signaling 
activities show no significant coefficient estimates. This underlines the difficulty of sending 
credible, that is reliable and not easy to copy, signals to reduce information asymmetries in 
markets for intangible goods. 
Hypotheses 9 and 10 – Competition  
The variable competitive pressure has a negative, but not significant impact on the informa-
tion quality, but a strong statistically significant negative impact on the contract conclusion 
rate. It indicates a plausible relationship between the intensity of competitive pressure and 
individual market performance. This is only partly consistent with hypothesis 9. Note, how-  21
ever, that the contract conclusion rate is only a very indirect measure for the quality of the 
information services provided.  
Our data shows no clear results for hypothesis 10. The coefficient estimate for consultation 
time savings shows a strong significant negative impact on the information quality, but a 
strong positive impact on the contract conclusion rate. Thus, given strong competitive pres-
sure to improve market performance it pays for insurance intermediaries to follow a high 
turnover strategy while reducing overall information service quality. Compared to that, cus-
tomer specialization and the provision of additional services for free significantly increase the 
information quality provided. However, they have no significant positive impact on market 
performance in terms of the contracts concluded. Obviously, there is no single strategy, which 
proves successful in reducing competitive pressure for insurance intermediaries while at the 
same time increasing the quality of the information services provided.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Despite their importance as match-makers in insurance markets, so far, there are only few 
empirical studies which analyze the factors that affect behavior and performance of insurance 
intermediaries in more detail. Based on a survey among German exclusive agents, independ-
ent agents and insurance brokers, we analyze what determinants influence the quality of the 
information services provided as well as the economic success of insurance intermediaries.  
Our econometric results confirm the main theoretical findings as to the poor working of com-
petition in markets which are characterized by profound information asymmetries. On the 
supply side general investment in human capital shows no significant impact. It is mainly the 
time spent on customer-specific activities like claims settlement, further training and the time 
spent for counseling interviews that lead to the provision of high quality services. Overall, 
there are also no gains from division of labor and specialization. On the demand side, con-
sumers’ knowledge has a positive influence on market outcomes in terms of the service qual-
ity offered. When looking at competition under asymmetric information, we find evidence 
that only reputation works as a credible signal. Besides, neither competitive pressure nor par-
ticular competitive strategies do improve market outcomes in terms of the information quality 
provided.  
However, intermediaries’ dependence from insurance companies, be it in legal or economic 
terms, shows a significant impact. In addition to our above results, Eckardt (2005, 174-198) 
finds that independent product range choice by intermediaries and customer specialization   22
explains some of the differences, while compensation schemes have no significant impact on 
market  outcomes.  Accordingly,  since  competition  does  not  automatically  improve  market 
performance in terms of the service quality provided, regulation should concentrate on in-
creasing  transparency  for  consumers  about  intermediaries  (in-)dependence  from  insurance 
companies. Besides, raising consumers’ financial literacy should also increase overall infor-
mation quality in the market for insurance intermediation services. 
   23
Table 2:  Regression Results Information Index and Contract Conclusion Rate
 
a Dependent variable: information index  
b Dependent variable: log(contract conclusion rate/(1- contract conclusion rate))  
(t-values in parentheses)
 
Dependent variable  Information Index
a  Contract  Conclusion Rate
b 
  Equ. 1  Equ.2  Equ. 3  Equ. 4  Equ. 5  Equ. 6 
  (N =637)  (N =696)  (N =636)  (N =545)  (N =663)  (N =586) 
Constant  2.650  2.368  2.795  1.835  2.030  2,579 
  (13.286***) (12.188***) (12.435***) (3.485***) (4.407***)  (4.831***)
Hypothesis 1 – Efforts Spent             
Age  0.002      -0.020  -0.018  -0.012 
  (0.711)      (-2.232**) (-3.438***)  (-2.316**)
Formal education             
Lower secondary school  0.105      -0.037     
  (1.313)      (-0.190)     
Intermediate leaving certificate  0.048      0.098     
   (0.915)      (0.749)     
Certificate of aptitude for   0.059      0.163     
specialized short-course higher 
education 
(1.050)      (1.129)     
(Additional) Training  0.027      -0.262     
   (0.398)      (-1.439)     
University degree  -0.031      -0.088     
  (-0.582)      (-0.662)     
Work experience  -0.001      0.003     
  (-0.136)      (0.296)     
Time budget             
Information acquisition and  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002  -0.005  -0.004  -0.006 
 Processing  (-1.030)  (-0.810)  (-1.162)  (-1.069)  (-0.950)  (-1.533) 
Counseling interviews  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.001 
   (1.612)  (1.029)  (0.869)  (1.079)  (0.433)  (0.240) 
Further training  0.007  0.009  0.006  0.001  -0.001  -0.004 
   (2.046**)  (3.058***) (2.445***) (0.118)  (-0.130)  (-0.554) 
Claims settlement  0.007  0.006  0.005  -0.004  -0.000  -0.005 
   (2.819***) (2.698***) (1.979**)  (-0.609)  (-0.029)  (-0.777) 
Sales efforts  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.035  -0.038  -0.023 
   (-0.275)  (-0.947)  (-0.551)  (-3.463***) (-4.846***)  (-2.813***)
Duration_interviews  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.005  0.004 
   (2.935***) (2.778***) (1.861*)  (2.794***) (3.361***)  (2.535***)
Further training_number  0.001      -0.020  -0.013  -0.009 
  (0.193)      (-2.210**) (-1.527)  (-1.107) 
Hypothesis 2 – Information Sources           
Information source             
Insurance companies  0.008  0.007  0.009  0.007     
   (1.952**)  (1.989**)  (2.693***) (0.713)     
Professional associations  0.005  0.005  0.003  -0.003     
  (1.458)  (1.672*)  (0.808)  (-0.373)     
Rating agencies  0.009  0.007  0.004  0.008     
  (2.501***) (2.135**)  (1.293)  (0.937)     
Consumers’ associations  0.011  0.012  0.009  0.014     
  (2.802***  (3.322***) (2.803***) (1.303)       24
Table 2:  Regression Results Information Index and Contract Conclusion Rate (cont.) 
Dependent variable  Information Index
a  Contract  Conclusion Rate
b 
  Equ. 1  Equ.2  Equ. 3  Equ. 4  Equ. 5  Equ. 6 
Science  0.014  0.011  0.010  -0.009     
   (3.470***) (3.085***) (2.865***) (-0.914)     
Specialist publications  0.011  0.012  0.007  -0.011     
  (2.601***) (2.881***) (1.763*)  (-1.074)     
General media  -0.007  -0.009  -0.006  0.000     
  (-1.542)  (-1.908*)  (-1.504)  (0.016)     
Source_further training   0.029  0.029  -0.016  0.068     
  (1.325)  (1.516)  (-0.904)  (1.379)     
Hypothesis 3 – Information content           
Information content             
Old-age security in general        0.003  0.020  -0.062 
        (0.069)  (0.441)  (-1.279) 
Calculation of participation rates        0.081  0.124  0.001 
        (1.597)  (2.842***)  (0.032) 
Contract design        -0.030  -0.016  -0.046 
        (-0.584)  (-0.364)  (-1.020) 
Personal risk profile and security        0.143  0.140  0.132 
options        (2.914***) (3.271***)  (2.798***)
Policy design        -0.040  -0.004  -0.031 
        (-0.719)  (-0.089)  (-0.604) 
Private old-age insurance         0.029  0.067  0.075 
products        (0.590)  (1.564)  (1.734*) 
Claims settlement        0.050  0.036  0.059 
        (0.990)  (0.808)  (1.297) 
Hypothesis 4 – Division of Labor and Specialization         
Employees_number  0.000      0.022    0.039 
  (0.027)      (0.965)    (1.905*) 
Intermediaries_number  0.002      0.006    -0.027 
  (0.227)      (0.189)    (-0.895) 
Hypothesis 5 – Independence from Insurance Companies       
Intermediary type             
Exclusive agent  -0.173  -0.173  -0.222  -0.678  -0.636  -0.495 
  (-3.580***) (-3.997***) (-4.900***) (-4.846***) (-5.504***)  (-3.906***)
Independent agent  -0.017  0.013  -0.046  -0.245  -0.335  -0.233 
  (-0.230)  (0.185)  (-0.708)  (-1.344)  (-2.005**)  (-1.363) 
Hypothesis 6 – Customers’ Demand           
Customers’ demand             
Information provision    0.049  0.029    -0.051   
    (1.445)  (1.014)    (-0.773)   
Additional services for free    0.080  0.033    -0.030   
    (3.300***) (1.556)    (-0.601)   
Hypothesis 7 – Customers’ Knowledge           
Customers’ knowledge             
Risk profile    0.037  0.019    0.048  0.051 
    (1.373)  (0.761)    (0.771)  (0.803) 
Old-age protection provisions    -0.062  -0.031    0.111  0.110 
    (-2.055**) (-1.140)    (1.648*)  (1.624*) 
(Dis-) Advantages of insurance     0.032  0.034    -0.082  -0.088 
products    (1.190)  (1.437)    (-1.381)  (-1.445)   25
Table 2:  Regression Results Information Index and Contract Conclusion Rate (cont.) 
Dependent variable  Information Index
a  Contract  Conclusion Rate
b 
  Equ. 1  Equ.2  Equ. 3  Equ. 4  Equ. 5  Equ. 6 
Hypothesis 8 - Signaling activities         
Reputation             
Information      0.206      0.107 
      (9.970***)     (1.960**) 
Good service      0.142      0.207 
      (6.955***)     (3.987***)
Sales efforts      0.017      -0.014 
      (0.894)      (-0.296) 
Other signaling instruments             
Advertising campaigns      0.046      -0.240 
      (0.704)      (-1.187) 
Customer specialization      -0.062      -0.052 
      (-1.539)      (0.642) 
Good service      0.026      -0.208 
      (0.439)      (-1.479) 
Professional lectures, seminars      0.015      0.282 
      (0.410)      (2.889***)
Qualification      0.155      0.248 
      (1.977**)      (1.137) 
Objective information and       0.063      0.079 
counseling      (1.082)      (0.571) 
Specialization on insurance       -0.063      -0.170 
company      (-0.995)      (-1.035) 
Miscellaneous      0.045      -0.195 
       (0.876)      (-1.567) 
Membership      -0.097      -0.360 
      (-2.242**)     (-3.270***)
Hypotheses 9 and 10 – Competition         
Competitive pressure      -0.014      -0.317 
      (-0.708)      (-6.734***)
Competitive strategies             
More advertising campaigns      0.036      -0.010 
      (0.797)      (-0,094) 
Better counseling quality      0.023      -0.098 
      (0.495)      (-0.842) 
Cost reductions      -0.023      -0.015 
      (-0.382)      (-0.098) 
Consultation time savings      -0.282      1.467 
      (-2.527***)     (2.751***)
Customer specialization      0.103      0.017 
      (2.663***)     (0.182) 
Additional services for a fee      0.134      -0.030 
      (2.572***)     (-0.220) 
Additional services for free      0.041      0.099 
      (1.168)      (1.061) 
Miscellaneous      0.020      0.179 
      (0.313)      (1.160) 
F-Statistics  5.511***  9.225***  11.503*** 3.791***  7.090***  6.360*** 
adj R^2
  0.156  0.199  0.410  0.145  0.168  0.283   26
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Table A.2: Main Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
Information index  3.71  3.70  1.41  5.00  0.53 
Contract conclusion rate  0.65  0.70  0.05  1.00  0.23 
Intermediary type           
Exclusive insurance agent  0.46  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.50 
Independent insurance agent  0.07  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.26 
Insurance broker  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.50 
Age  43.15  42.00  20.00  64.00  8.96 
Work experience  16.11  14.00  1.00  48.00  8.33 
Time budget           
Information acquisition and 
processing 
21.36  20.00  0.00  70.00  12.42 
Counseling interviews  36.88  35.00  0.00  87.00  15.61 
Further training  11.57  10.00  0.00  35.00  6.62 
Claims settlement  11.14  10.00  0.00  50.00  7.54 
Sales efforts  6.18  5.00  0.00  70.00  5.70 
Duration_interviews  56.57  60.00  10.00  180.00  31.46 
Information source           
Insurance companies  11.09  10.00  1.00  25.00  5.76 
Professional associations  12.13  12.00  1.00  25.00  5.71 
Rating agencies  11.31  12.00  1.00  25.00  6.24 
Consumers’ associations  8.04  8.00  1.00  25.00  5.35 
Science  9.16  9.00  1.00  25.00  5.47 
Specialist publications  13.80  12.00  1.00  25.00  5.47 
General media  6.63  6.00  1.00  25.00  4.46 
Employees_number  3.81  3.00  1.00  30.00  3.86 
Customers’ demand            
Information provision  4.01  4.00  1.00  5.00  0.75 
Additional services for free  3.75  4.00  1.00  5.00  0.93 
Customers’ knowledge           
Risk profile  2.75  3.00  1.00  5.00  0.76 
Old-age protection provisions  3.00  3.00  1.00  5.00  0.75 
(Dis-) advantages of insurance 
products 
2.33  2.00  1.00  5.00  0.86 
Other signaling instruments           
Advertising campaigns  0.04  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.20 
Customer specialization  0.24  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.43 
Good Service  0.86  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.35 
Professional lectures, seminars  0.27  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.44 
Qualification  0.93  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.26 
Objective information   0.87  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.34 
Specialization on insurer  0.08  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.28 
Membership  0.76  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.43 
Competitive pressure  3.33  3.00  1.00  5.00  1.00 
Competitive strategies           
More advertising campaigns  0.21  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.40 
Better counseling quality  0.80  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.40 
Cost reductions  0.09  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.29 
Consultation time savings  0.01  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.08 
Customer specialization  0.46  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.50 
Additional services for a fee  0.10  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.30 
Additional services for free  0.57  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.50 
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Table A.3: Factor Analysis Information Content – Rotated Component Matrix 
  Components           
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 




















Tax advantages  .809             
Occupational pension 





           









           





           
Surplus and interest 
rate changes 
   
.782 
         
Non commitment    .709           
Guaranteed perform-
ance 
   
.702 
         
Surplus determinants    .619           
Past effective surplus    .615           
Termination options      .845         
Contract period      .789         
Procedures of con-
tract modification 
     
.658 
       
Costs of contract 
modification 
     
.585 
       
Type and coverage of 
the insured risks 
       
.725 
     
Individual security 
gaps 
       
.695 
     
Insurance and product 
types 
       
.609 
     
(Dis-) advantages of 
different security 
options 
       
 
.533 
     
Premium design          .778     
Price-performance 
tests 
         
.762 
   
Cost components          .593     
Capital sum life in-
surance vs. Riester 
policy 




Cost calculation by 
change of policy 
           
.774 
 
Specific rest life in-
surance vs. capital 
sum life insurance 




Claim settlement              .710 
Conflict settlement              .602 
Extraction Method: Principal component analysis.    
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalization.   32
Table A.4:  Factor Analysis Information Content – Sampling Adequacy and Total Variance  
                    Explained 
Measure of sampling adequacy by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics     0.889 





Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Component  Total  % of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive %  Total  % of 
Variance
Cumula-




1  7.658 28.361 28.361 7.658 28.361 28.361 2.876 10.654 10.654
2  1.884 6.976 35.337 1.884 6.976 35.337 2.758 10.215 20.868
3  1.754 6.496 41.834 1.754 6.496 41.834 2.652 9.823 30.691
4  1.513 5.605 47.439 1.513 5.605 47.439 2.374 8.792 39.483
5  1.415 5.242 52.681 1.415 5.242 52.681 2.209 8.181 47.664
6  1.252 4.638 57.319 1.252 4.638 57.319 2.004 7.421 55.085
7  1.076 3.985 61.304 1.076 3.985 61.304 1.679 6.219 61.304
8  .795 2.944 64.248
9  .781 2.891 67.139
10  .754 2.791 69.930
11  .729 2.702 72.632
12  .697 2.580 75.212
13  .648 2.399 77.611
14  .620 2.297 79.909
15  .573 2.121 82.029
16  .549 2.034 84.064
17  .505 1.870 85.934
18  .491 1.817 87.751
19  .459 1.700 89.451
20  .430 1.593 91.044
21  .420 1.558 92.601
22  .397 1.470 94.072
23  .373 1.370 95.451
24  .350 1.298 96.749
25  .319 1.180 97.930
26  .301 1.116 99.046
27  .258 .954 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table A.5:  Factor Analysis Reputation – Rotated Component Matrix 
  Components   
  1  2  3 
Variables  Information  Good Service Sales Efforts 
Objective information on products  .733     
Information on more favorable alternatives  .675     
Product quality  .653     
Qualification  .615     
Regular Information about tax law and social law .570     
Reliable and kind service    .768   
Empathy    .720   
Reliable and quick claims settlement    .653   
Frequent and regular customer contacts    .564   
Advertising efforts      .785 
Reputation of the insurance company       .641 
 
Extraction Method: Principal component analysis.    
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalization. 
 
 
Table A.6: Factor Analysis Reputation – Sampling Adequacy and Total Variance Explained 
Measure of sampling adequacy by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics     0.742 
Total variance explained 
  Initial Eigenvalues 
 
 




















1  2.996 27.238 27.238 2.996 27.238 27.238 2.254 20.493 20.493
2  1.534 13.946 41.184 1.534 13.946 41.184 1.942 17.651 38.144
3  1.190 10.820 52.004 1.190 10.820 52.004 1.525 13.859 52.004
4  1.023 9.302 61.306
5  .779 7.082 68.388
6  .715 6.501 74.889  
7  .655 5.958 80.847  
8  .607 5.522 86.369  
9  .555 5.043 91.411  
10  .506 4.599 96.010  
11  .439 3.990 100.00  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 